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THE SECOND WAY:  A COMMENT ON HAWKINS AND A 
CAUTIONARY NOTE 
Richard Sander∗ 
After a decade of intense debate, the question of whether mis-
match exists has been largely resolved.  Dozens of studies published 
in peer review journals1 have found increasingly precise evidence of 
first-order mismatch effects,2 and critics, who ten years ago seemed so 
formidable, have largely fallen silent.3 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, UCLA; Ph.D., Economics. 
 1 A sampling includes:  STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY:  
THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 100–38 (2003); 
Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo & V. Joseph Hotz, University Differences in the 
Graduation of Minorities in STEM Fields:  Evidence from California, AM. ECON. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015); Esther Duflo et al., Peer Effects, Teaching Incentives, and the Impact of 
Tracking:  Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1739 (2011); 
Fredrick L. Smyth & John J. McArdle, Ethnic and Gender Differences in Science Graduation at 
Selective Colleges With Implications for Admission Policy and College Choice, 45 RES. HIGHER 
EDUC. 353, 373 (2004); Doug Williams, Do Racial Preferences Affect Minority Learning in Law 
Schools?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2013).  
 2 “First-order” mismatch effects are those where there is a direct causal connection between 
large credential disparities among students and an observable effect.  In Richard Sander, 
The Stylized Critique of Mismatch, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1642–43 (2014), I identified and 
discussed three types of first-order effects:  learning mismatch, competition mismatch, 
and social mismatch.  Where good measures exist, these are the easiest mismatch effects 
to document, precisely because of the straightforward causation path.  “Second-order” 
effects—such as the effect of mismatch on college graduation rates—are much harder to 
document; thus, for example, students do not fail to graduate because of mismatch itself, 
but because the first-order types of mismatch may affect their success in completing a 
degree.  Since a college may take countermeasures that affect the second-order result 
(i.e., by making it easier to graduate or tolerating grade inflation) without addressing the 
underlying first-order problem, second-order effects can be even harder to measure.  See 
also Arcidiacono et al., A Conversation on the Nature, Effects, and Future of Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 695, 709–19 (2015). (Questions 4, 5, and 6) 
 3 So far as I know, none of the very vocal critics of law school mismatch who were writing a 
decade ago, such as Richard Lempert, Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Daniel Ho, Michelle 
Dauber, or David Wilkins, have followed up with successfully peer-reviewed research 
refuting the mismatch hypothesis.  A recent joint venture by some of them known as the 
“Empirical Scholars Brief” has been utterly discredited.  See Brief of Empirical Scholars as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2012) (No. 11-345); Richard Sander, Diversity in Legal Education and the  Legal Profession:  
A Symposium Honoring Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard:  Mismatch and the Empirical 
Scholars Brief, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 573, 583 (2014) (discrediting the Empirical Scholars 
Brief). 
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Professor Stacy Hawkins brings to these issues a fresh perspective 
and a thoughtful argument.4  She neither agrees with nor explicitly 
denies the mismatch phenomenon, but contends that even if mis-
match is a real problem, this merely heightens the need to both re-
think the ways that colleges achieve racial diversity and to implement 
far-reaching changes in higher education policies.  Hawkins is there-
fore not an apologist for the current system or someone claiming that 
racial preferences by themselves are the key to successful diversity.  
She is instead a reformer, and a fairly far-reaching reformer at that.  
In this sense Hawkins and I are kindred spirits; I greatly admire her 
spirit of reform and, when we have conversations about higher educa-
tion policy in this area, we agree on a great deal.5 
I write this piece not so much to criticize or rebut Hawkins’ argu-
ment as to raise a series of strong caveats about it.  Her argument is, 
in a way, orthogonal to the traditional mismatch debate; she finds 
both sides in that debate relying too much on sets of numbers—in 
particular, standardized test scores and grades—that she views as 
largely illegitimate measures of performance and merit.  The task (as 
she sees it) is for colleges and universities to find better measures of 
merit and talent, and to develop strategies to nourish that talent with-
in their academic programs.  I agree with these goals, and I have 
spent a good deal of time working on and even implementing some 
of them.6  However, the devil is in the details.  In the process of laying 
out her vision, Hawkins makes many assumptions about mismatch 
that are unwarranted and representations that are misguided.  She 
embraces a good deal of research that, while impressive at face value, 
does not have as much real-world significance as she suggests, and in 
some cases is simply wrong.  Many readers could come away from the 
Hawkins article concluding that things really are not so bad after all, 
or that colleges and universities have already gotten the message and 
are making the right kinds of reforms.  Just the opposite is the case.  
Reform is vitally needed, and steps towards reform, if they are to have 
meaningful effects, must be considered and evaluated in a disci-
plined, rigorous, and initially skeptical way.  We need greater trans-
 
 4 Stacy L. Hawkins, Mismatched or Counted Out?  What’s Missing from Mismatch Theory and Why 
it Matters, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 863 (2015). 
 5 For example, see the Hawkins and Sander discussion of Questions 11 and 12 in 
Arcidiacono et al., supra note 2, at 721–28.  
 6 I coauthored what is still perhaps the most definitive study of law school academic 
support programs and pioneered a system of class-based affirmative action to foster 
greater socioeconomic diversity at my law school.  See Kristine S. Knaplund & Richard H. 
Sander, The Art and Science of Academic Support, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1995); Richard H. 
Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997). 
Feb. 2015] THE SECOND WAY 913 
 
parency, and we need to zealously evaluate reforms, or we will find 
ourselves simply substituting a new, soft ideology for the old one, with 
real progress in reducing mismatch, and improving minority student 
outcomes, as far away as ever. 
I.  CLARIFICATIONS AND CONUNDRUMS 
Although Professor Hawkins often tries to be fair to mismatch 
theory, at other points she seriously mischaracterizes it, probably 
more out of misunderstanding than malice.  To the extent that she is 
reflecting common misunderstandings of mismatch, I welcome this 
opportunity to clarify the record. 
A.  The Naiveté Argument   
Hawkins suggests that mismatch theory suffers from “tunnel vi-
sion,”7 by focusing too much on the relationship between academic 
credentials and higher education outcomes.  “Mismatch theory is al-
luring in its simplicity . . . [but the] theory’s causal claims linking ac-
ademic credentials to academic performance actually rely on a series 
of intermediate assumptions.”8  “Mismatch theory’s isolation from the 
rich store of data and research in the fields of cognitive and devel-
opmental psychology is problematic given the intersections between 
this research and the claims on which mismatch theory is based.”9 
These statements are wrong both in letter and in spirit.  Some of 
the earliest social scientists to empirically test the mismatch hypothe-
sis were cognitive psychologists, such as Rogers Elliot at Dartmouth 
University and Frederick Smyth at the University of Virginia.10  These 
scholars found that students who had academic credentials (meas-
ured in a variety of ways, not just with test scores) far below those of 
their classmates, tended to drop out of science majors at rates that 
were not simply higher than those of their classmates with stronger 
credentials, but higher than the rate for similar “comparison” stu-
dents at other institutions who did not have a large credential gap 
with their classmates.11  These psychologists did not start out intend-
 
 7 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 861. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 857. 
 10 See Rogers Elliott, A. Christopher Strenta, Russell Adair, Michael Matier & Jannah Scott, 
The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly Selective Institutions, 37 RES. 
HIGHER EDUC. 681 (1996); Smyth & McArdle, supra note 1. 
 11 Elliot, Strenta, Adair, Matier & Scott, supra note 10, at 701 tbl. 2; Smyth & McArdle, supra 
note 1, at 369 fig. 4.  
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ing to make an argument about academic credential gaps and mis-
match; nor were mismatch hypotheses the only ones they tested.  Ra-
ther, the idea of mismatch (in this case, “competition” mismatch) 
found them—it arose from their careful examination of the data and 
the models. 
Similarly, the remarkable randomized experiments at the Air 
Force Academy12 (described in Part IV, below) were not aimed at 
studying mismatch, but at testing an innovative approach to peer 
learning.  The experimental results, perplexing at first, led the re-
searchers to investigate mismatch (in this case “social mismatch”) as a 
possible explanation, which indeed robustly explained the results.  
This is hardly “tunnel vision”; it is, rather, scientific inquiry at its best. 
Yet another example is the experimental research of Esther Duflo 
and her colleagues.  A very large, randomized experiment showed 
that learning decreased as the measured academic preparation level 
of students in a classroom increased in heterogeneity.13  There are no 
“intermediate assumptions” in the Duflo study, which was published 
in the American Economics Review.  It is a scientific, randomized exper-
iment that admits of no alternative explanation. 
Professor Hawkins never shows that any of the mismatch research 
is incorrect, or that the results presented in any mismatch paper 
would somehow change if different explanatory factors were inserted 
into the regression equations.  Thus, to the extent her argument is 
that mismatch findings are wrong or incomplete, such assertions are 
unfounded and unsupported.  I suspect Hawkins is confusing the 
“positive” and “normative” dimensions of the affirmative action de-
bate.  As a “positive” matter, the first-order effects of mismatch have 
been rigorously established with scientific studies; serious conse-
quences follow when we create large credential gaps among students.  
Normatively, there are many ways we might address mismatch prob-
lems (and other performance gaps across different groups of stu-
dents), and I enthusiastically agree with many of Hawkins’ reform 
proposals, as long as it is understood that some kind of change is 
needed in the status quo, and the reform options we take seriously 
 
 12 Scott E. Carrell, Bruce I. Sacerdote & James E. West, From Natural Variation to Optimal 
Policy?  The Importance of Endogenous Peer Group Formation, 81 ECONOMETRICA 855 (2013).  
See also notes 62–66 and accompanying text.  
 13 Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kramer, Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, the Impact 
of Tracking:  Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Kenya, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1739 
(2011).  
Feb. 2015] THE SECOND WAY 915 
 
should be implemented on an experimental basis and rigorously 
evaluated.14 
B.  Race and Mismatch   
A major theme of Professor Hawkins’ article is that much of the 
underperformance attributed to mismatch is actually due to envi-
ronmental conditions on campuses affecting minority (especially 
black) students, which she mostly groups into “stereotype threat” and 
“stigma threat” issues.15  This argument is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the mismatch literature.  In the bulk of this lit-
erature, and in analyses dealing with all three types of “first-order” 
mismatch effects, there are no differences between blacks, whites, 
and Hispanics in the way that mismatch operates.16  Or, to put this 
more precisely, “race” tends to be a non-significant predictor of per-
formance once mismatch effects are held constant. 
This should be seen as good news, since racial problems are often 
so hard to diagnose and effectively address.  Indeed, one of the rea-
sons that I wrote my original paper on law school mismatch was to 
demonstrate that there was nothing peculiar to African-American law 
students—aside from the fact that they tended to receive very large 
admissions preferences—that was causing them to fail the bar at 
higher rates than comparable white students.17  But it is also very 
powerful evidence against the claim that stereotype and stigma 
threat, to the extent they exist at all in real world settings, are having 
much impact upon the academic performance of minority students.  
If learning mismatch, competition mismatch, and social mismatch all 
operate at a similar level across racial lines—as many studies have 
now shown they do—then this crowds out any explanatory power for 
stereotype threat and stigma threat. 
 
 14 Hawkins often implies that mismatch scholarship is brimming over with normative 
arguments for eliminating or curtailing racial preferences.  But the vast majority of this 
scholarship (including, for example, the leading works cited at note 1 supra) either make 
no normative arguments at all, or advance very mild suggestions, such as providing 
greater transparency to students applying to college. 
 15 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 873–83. 
 16 This is the finding of many mismatch theorists and most mismatch studies that have 
specifically considered the question.  See, e.g., Smyth & McArdle, supra note 1; see also 
Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo & Ken Spenner, What Happens After Enrollment?  An 
Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice, 1 IZA J. LABOR ECON. 
5 (2012), available at http://www.izajole.com/content/1/1/5; Richard H. Sander, A 
Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action at American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004). 
 17 Sander, supra note 16, at 429, 449–54 (discussing the author’s motivation behind writing 
the article). 
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C.  First-order and Second-order Mismatch Effects   
As explained in footnote 2 above, and at greater length else-
where,18 I and other mismatch scholars have found it quite useful to 
distinguish “first-order” mismatch effects—things that result directly 
from credential gaps among students—from “second-order” effects, 
which are indirect consequences of the first-order effects.  “Learning 
mismatch” is an example of a first-order effect; students learn less in 
an environment where they have levels of academic preparation far 
below most of their peers.  Depressed graduation rates are a second-
order effect; a student might be less likely to graduate from college if 
they are learning less, but, then again, they might graduate anyway if 
the learning mismatch is not very severe, or if the college tries hard to 
graduate every student.  The point of distinguishing among different 
types of first-order effects (learning mismatch, competition mis-
match, and social mismatch) and the more contingent second-order 
effects is to make more precise just what we are talking about when 
we discuss mismatch, and also to make clear that first-order effects, 
because they are direct effects, will tend to show up more consistently 
in the empirical literature. 
Hawkins advances a critique that seems linked to this first-
order/second-order distinction.  She writes, 
according to mismatch theory, weaker relative academic credentials gen-
erate the following intermediate forms of mismatch:  learning mismatch, 
competition mismatch, and social mismatch.  It is these three intermedi-
ate forms of mismatch that ultimately [cause] academic underperfor-
mance.  But it is important to note that it is academic underperformance, 
and not these intermediate forms of mismatch, which is the crux of the 
harm claimed to accrue to URMs under mismatch theory.19 
These statements are wrong in several different ways.  The first-order 
effects are not “intermediate”; they are the actual mismatch phenom-
ena.  They cause direct harm to students.  Whether they produce ac-
ademic underperformance depends on circumstances.  For example, 
social mismatch directly reduces social interaction between students 
at the same college who have very different levels of academic prepa-
ration.  This can cause students to suffer academically,20 but the direct 
and primary harm is a reduction in interaction—which, when it cor-
relates with race, reduces the benefits of racial diversity on campus.21  
 
 18 See Sander, supra note 2, at 1642–43. 
 19 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 861–62. 
 20 See infra Part IV. 
 21 See Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo, Andrew Hussey & Ken Spenner, Racial Segregation 
Patterns in Selective Universities, 56 J. LAW AND ECON. 1039, 1040 (2013) (“The benefits 
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Or consider competition mismatch, which often causes students with 
low relative academic preparation to abandon a preferred field (of-
ten in the sciences or engineering) for one less competitive (such as 
communications).22  It does not follow that the affected student will 
academically “underperform” in terms of, for example, GPA or grad-
uation outcomes—indeed, the student who switches to communica-
tions may have a higher GPA and an easier time graduating.  But 
there is still a harm if mismatch means the student must abandon her 
dream of becoming, say, an engineer. 
II.  IMPROVED MEASURES OF ACADEMIC POTENTIAL 
A central tenet of Professor Hawkins’ argument is that mismatch 
critics are overly focused on the standardized test score gap between 
racial minorities and other students (for simplicity of empiricism and 
exposition, I will focus on “African-American/black” and “An-
glo/white” students).23  Hawkins believes that these gaps overstate the 
difference in academic potential between blacks and whites, and that 
the gaps also overstate the degree of preference that universities use 
in admitting African Americans.24  She also believes that by focusing 
on aspects of student merit, such as “grit,” one can identify students 
whose abilities greatly exceed whatever might be indicated by their 
test scores, and thus neutralize the test-score gap.25 
Here as elsewhere, I thoroughly agree with part of Hawkins’ claim:  
we most certainly should devote effort and resources towards finding 
and developing alternate measures of student potential.26  The cur-
rent metrics used by colleges and graduate schools are only moder-
ately successful in predicting success (though they are a good deal 
 
derived from student diversity, however, will likely not merely depend on the racial 
composition of the student body but also on the frequency and intensity of social 
interaction and friendship among students of different races.”); Peter Arcidiacono, 
Shakeeb Khan, & Jacob L. Vigdor, Representation versus Assimilation:  How do Preferences in 
College Admissions Affect Social Interactions?, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1 (2011) (discussing the 
actual existence of diversity on campuses). 
 22 See Smyth & McArdle, supra note 1, at 354–57 (citing studies that reached this 
conclusion). 
 23 E.g., Hawkins, supra note 4, at 862–63. 
 24 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 863. 
 25 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 868–70. 
 26 I did something similar at UCLA Law School by creating a measure of college GPA that 
took into account grade inflation and competitiveness in college; this so-called “national 
grade” gave less weight to highly elite schools (such as Stanford and the Ivy League) than 
did UCLA’s former measures (and thus helped low-SES applicants, on balance).  It also 
did a substantially better job of predicting law school performance. 
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better than is often claimed);27 it is clear we could do at least some-
what better.  And the current metrics tend to be skewed in ways that 
favor more affluent students (though they are less skewed than the 
college selection methods they replaced).28  Better measures deserve 
our investment and support. 
At times, Hawkins seems to imply that colleges and universities are 
already using these improved measures in assessing students, and that 
the apparent racial disparities suggested by test-score differences are 
therefore much smaller in practice.29  In other words, she suggests 
that current affirmative action programs do not involve very large 
preferences, but smaller preferences based on the insight of admis-
sions officers into the more subtle achievements of black and other 
minority applicants.30  However, Hawkins offers no evidence on this 
point, and there is, in fact, not the slightest quantitative evidence that 
this is true.  On the contrary, where data is available on the admis-
sions decisions of selective universities, test scores, high school 
grades, and achievement tests clearly account for the bulk of admis-
 
 27 For example, it is often pointed out that entering credentials (for example, some 
combination of test scores and pre-entry grades) predict only about 20% of the variation 
in student performance, and sometimes even less.  But such a statistic ignores the 
“restriction in range” problem:  students within an academic program, since they are all 
selected by these credentials, have very little variation in their test scores and prior 
grades—and these are thus necessarily weak predictors of performance at school.  In 
situations that avoid the restriction of range problem, “credentials” do a much better job 
of prediction.  Sander, supra note 16, at 420.  An interesting example comes from large 
law firms; law school grades strongly predict which first-year associates eventually make 
partner, though law firm partners clearly do not consider law school transcripts when 
they award new partnerships.  See Richard Sander & Jane Bambauer, The Secret of My 
Success:  How Status, Eliteness, and School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 893, 911 (2012) (“GPA is strongly predictive of one’s survival at the big 
firm.”). 
 28 Nicholas Lemann’s The Big Test:  The Secret History of American Meritocracy (1999), explores 
how the SAT emerged in significant part out of efforts by elite colleges to develop a more 
“meritocratic” approach to admissions that would expand opportunities for students 
outside private schools and other traditional feeder schools for the Ivy League, such as 
working-class students, children of immigrants, and those in rural areas.  And while there 
are large “class” disparities in performance in standardized tests, most of this appears to 
accurately reflect differences in academic preparation.  There is little evidence that low-
SES students on average outperform their college (or graduate school) performance as 
predicted by standardized test scores and grades.  See THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & 
ALEXANDRIA W. RADFORD, NO LONGER SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL:  RACE AND CLASS IN 
ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFE, 250–51 (2009) (reporting results of a large-
scale analysis of students at selective colleges and finding that social class does not 
significantly predict higher or lower class rank). 
 29 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 865–67. 
 30 Id. 
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sions decisions—and this is, if anything, generally more true of black 
applicants than white ones.31 
Moreover, when we predict the performance of college or gradu-
ate students based on their standard entering credentials (test scores 
and earlier grades), we find that black and Hispanic students either 
perform at the level predicted by their credentials, or somewhat un-
derperform.32  (Hawkins suggests this underperformance reflects the 
effects of stereotype or stigma threat; I discuss elsewhere in this Arti-
cle why this does not seem to be true, but for now let us set it aside.33)  
If colleges were using other indicia of academic promise that tended 
to correct for the racial test-score gap, then it follows that black and 
Hispanic students would outperform those traditional credentials. 
The one example of which I am aware in which higher education 
leaders were able to improve racial representation and reduce racial 
performance gaps, is at the University of California.  Some time ago, 
the university began to calculate an “adjusted” measure of high 
school grades (“UC-adjusted HSGPA”), which considered a standard 
set of courses from California high schools, and made uniform ad-
justments to GPAs based on the relative difficulties of the courses 
(giving more weight to “honors” and “AP” classes).34  Purged of much 
of the noise that plagues high school GPA measures, the UC-adjusted 
HSGPA was a far better predictor of college grades than the unad-
justed measure, and better even than SAT or ACT scores (though us-
ing both test scores and UC-adjusted HSGPA produced still better 
predictions).35  Moreover, using this measure disproportionately ben-
efited black and Hispanic applicants to UC schools.36  For all of these 
reasons, this innovation is an important example of what universities 
can and should do to achieve the kind of goal Hawkins advocates.  
 
 31 The best available data on this point comes from law schools.  My analysis of admissions 
data from forty public law schools over admissions cycles between 2005 and 2007 found 
that a combination of LSAT scores, undergraduate grades, and race could account for 
86% of all admissions decisions.  If one examined only black applicants, then LSAT 
scores and undergraduate grades alone accounted for an average of 88% of all admissions 
decisions.  See Richard H. Sander, Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency:  The Practical 
Effects of Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 296 (Kevin 
McGuire ed., 2012) (discussing the fact that schools wanted to lean heavily on test scores 
and grades). 
 32 This is shown in a wide array of studies, including those cited at notes 55–56 infra. 
 33 See infra text accompanying notes 48–60. 
 34 See Kate Antonovics & Ben Backes, The Effect of Banning Affirmative Action on College 
Admissions Policies and Student Quality, 49 J. HUM. RESOURCES 295, 296 (2014) (examining 
“the end of race- based affirmative action at the University of California”). 
 35 Calculation by the author based on the 2008–10 UCOP database (available on request 
from the author).  
 36 Antonovics & Backes, supra note 34. 
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But it should also sober our expectations, for using the UC-adjusted 
HSGPA only offset between 3% and 10% of the effects of not using 
racial preferences at UCLA and Berkeley after Proposition 209.37 
The broader notion that racial disparities simply reflect inadequa-
cies in how we measure academic preparation is not well supported.  
The National Assessment of Educational Progress (“NAEP”) performs 
very extensive testing to capture trends in learning in American 
schools; unlike standardized tests such as the SAT, NAEP’s measures 
are based on subject-matter learning in specific fields covered by vir-
tually all schools.  I have discussed these results at greater length 
elsewhere,38 but the simple bottom line is that the NAEP-measured 
racial gaps closely approximate those captured by the SAT.39  The 
median African-American in twelfth grade is at a level of academic 
preparation comparable to the median white eighth grader.40 
One of the most significant efforts ever undertaken to reduce ra-
cial bias in the measurement of learning was the development of the 
“performance test” component of the California Bar Exam in the ear-
ly 1980s.41  Research consistently showed a large racial disparity in 
performance on traditional bar exams, which consisted of a “multi-
state” multiple choice exam and a series of “essay” questions analo-
gous to law school final exams.  Both were subject to the criticisms 
that they measured “academic” rather than “practical” knowledge, 
and were likely to disadvantage minority students who might do poor-
ly on standardized tests but would actually make fine lawyers.  The 
California Bar set about experimenting with a variety of other evalua-
tion strategies that might address these concerns, and through very 
extensive research came up with the “performance exam.”  In this 
one-day test, bar-takers would open a file of materials that simulated 
 
 37 Id. at 310. 
 38 See RICHARD SANDER & STUART J. TAYLOR, MISMATCH:  HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS 
STUDENTS IT’S SUPPOSED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 261–62 
(2012). 
 39 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION PROGRESS 
2008:  TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS 15 (2009). 
 40 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2013-456, NAEP 2012 TRENDS IN ACADEMIC 
PROGRESS (2013).  The National Assessment of Educational Progress (“NAEP”) is the na-
tion’s largest effort to develop systematic measures of learning in the nation’s schools and 
make those measures comparable over time.  According to this quadrennial overview re-
port, the median reading score for 13-year-old whites was 270 in 2012; the median read-
ing score for 17-year-old blacks was 269.  Id. at 17–18.  The median NAEP mathematics 
score for 13-year-old whites was 293 in 2012; the median mathematics score for 17-year-
old blacks was 288.  Id. at 39–40.  
 41 This story is described in Stephen P. Klein’s An Analysis of the Relationship Between Trial 
Practice Skills and Bar Examination Results 1–10 (1983). 
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the sort of real-world tasks lawyers regularly undertake:  a memo out-
lining a client’s problem and a variety of other evidentiary and legal 
materials that the test-taker would use to fashion a strategy for her 
client. 
This performance test, which was permanently incorporated into 
the California Bar exam and has gradually been adopted by other ju-
risdictions, did succeed in making the bar exam more relevant to ac-
tual lawyer problems; it may also have given law schools a reward for 
and incentive in developing clinical programs.  But it did nothing to 
reduce the racial performance gap, which was exactly the same size 
on the performance exam as on the other portions of the bar exam.42 
Another important real-world experiment reinforces this finding.  
In the early 2000s, UCLA initiated an admissions process through 
which readers evaluated applications on three separate dimensions:  
academic achievement, life challenges, and “personal achieve-
ment”—this last category focusing on such things as contributions to 
one’s community, extra-curricular activities, and talents and skills not 
captured by ordinary academic measures.43  The implication of the 
Hawkins critique is that with such a measure, underrepresented mi-
norities with so-so academic credentials would have higher-than-
average levels of personal achievement (so that an admissions process 
taking those into account would correct racial disparities).  Certainly 
UCLA, which was trying hard to overcome the effects of a ban on the 
use of racial preferences, had every incentive to produce such results.  
But as it turns out, race did not predict levels of personal achieve-
ment.44  What did predict personal achievement was, of all things, ac-
ademic achievement; students who had academic achievement levels 
a standard deviation above the average of UCLA applicants had per-
sonal achievement levels that were a third of a standard deviation 
above the average.45 
Professor Hawkins mentions some valuable initiatives that certain-
ly deserve further investigation, experimentation, and support.  The 
Posse program, as she suggests, has been successful in identifying mi-
nority students with high levels of “grit,” and this does indeed predict 
success in college.46  But the percentage of students so identified is so 
 
 42 Id. at 12. 
 43 Richard H. Sander & Medha Uppala, Racial Discrimination in UCLA Undergraduate 
Admissions:  An Inquiry in Depth 10–11 (Sept. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 44 See id. at 11.   
 45 Id.  Further analysis has since been conducted by the author. 
 46 See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 889–92. 
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small that there are real questions about how widely this model can 
be generalized.  What would be the cost, and the feasible payoff, of 
institutionalizing this on a scale large enough to replace a substantial 
part of current preferential admissions?  Similarly, Hawkins cites ap-
provingly the work done by scholars at Berkeley on the usually-
overlooked characteristics of lawyers that predict success in their ca-
reers.47  This work, too, is interesting and worthy of further support 
and (in particular) large-scale experimentation.  But to date, the 
Berkeley project has not produced a workable alternative to current 
law school admissions systems, partly because the main purpose of 
current law school admissions procedures is to identify students aca-
demically able to do the work, and the subjects of the Berkeley re-
search have all already met those criteria.  The Berkeley studies need 
to experiment with actual law school admissions, not only to see to 
what extent applicants can “game” the more subjective critiera used, 
but also to determine whether these critiera can actually identify stu-
dents who will do well in law school and whether the critieria pro-
duce a significant racial dividend. 
III.  STEREOTYPE THREAT AND STIGMA THREAT 
A second pillar of Professor Hawkins’ argument is that un-
derrepresented students often perform below their potential because 
of “stereotype” threat and “stigma” threat, both of which undermine 
students’ self-confidence and make it more difficult for them to per-
form at their best.  If we can counter these by reducing prejudice and 
hostility among “majority” students on campus, then the initiatives 
aimed at picking the best minority students will lead to very strong 
performance, and eventual college and career success. 
There is certainly a good deal of intriguing laboratory evidence that 
stereotype threat in particular can undermine performance of all 
sorts of groups (the evidence is much weaker for stigma threat).48  
But there are four enormous obstacles to taking these phenomena 
seriously as part of the type of strategy Hawkins proposes. 
First, as I noted in Part I, stereotype threat and stigma threat can-
not explain mismatch because mismatch is not, in significant meas-
ure, a racial phenomena.  It disproportionately affects some minori-
ties because of the operation of racial preferences in admissions, but 
 
 47 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 906. 
 48 An early, classic analysis is Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Test Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST 
SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, eds., 1998). 
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mismatch studies have shown again and again that mismatch affects 
whites who receive preferences too,49 and that mismatch does not af-
fect blacks who do not receive preferences, or who receive smaller 
preferences.50 
Second, there is a good deal of evidence that stereotype threat 
does not have large effects in real-world settings.  Paul Sackett, whose 
work is cited approvingly by Hawkins in another context,51 has under-
taken with colleagues several experiments aimed at creating a degree 
of “stereotype threat” in real-world testing situations.52  His results 
strongly suggested an absence of stereotype threat.  My own research 
on legal education finds that the black/white gaps in performance 
are the same (or higher) in evaluation settings with low stereotype 
threat (i.e., legal writing classes where students work in loose collabo-
ration with a small section instructor) and those with high stereotype 
threat (timed, all-important, end-of-semester final exams).53  There 
are good conceptual reasons to explain the lack of translation of the-
se results from the lab to the real world.54 
Third, the evidence that minority undergraduates “underper-
form” their credentials in college is not particularly good evidence 
that these students’ grades are undermined by stereotype threat and 
 
 49 See, e.g., Smyth & McArdle, supra note 1, at 369 (showing virtually identical patterns for 
whites and underrepresented minorities); Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo & Ken 
Spenner, What Happens After Enrollment?  An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in 
GPA and Major Choice, 1 IZA J. LAB. ECON. 5 (2012) (noting that although blacks at Duke 
drop out of science and economics majors at much higher rates than whites, “accounting 
for academic background can fully account for differences in switching behaviors across 
blacks and whites”).  
 50 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Hawkins responds to this point by suggesting 
that the result of “good outcomes” for minorities in low-preference environments is 
driven by blacks at HCBUs, where the better outcomes do not reflect the absence of 
preferences, but the absence of racism.  Hawkins, supra note 4, at 878–80.  This is a 
thoughtful point, but a close look at the literature shows that it does not hold.  Blacks in 
lower- or low-preference environments at majority-white institutions have the same 
amount of improvement in performance outcomes that the mismatch hypotheses predict.  
Doug Williams, for example, has run his “first-choice/second-choice” analyses with HCBU 
law schools excluded from the analysis, and finds exactly the same benefits to blacks 
attending a second-choice school using lower preferences (the standard errors in his 
analysis go up, reflecting the smaller sample size, but the coefficients remain identical).   
 51 See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 866 n.34.  
 52 See Paul R. Sackett & Ann Marie Ryan, Concerns About Generalizing Stereotype Threat Research 
Findings to Operational High-Stakes Testing, in STEREOTYPE THREAT:  THEORY, PROCESS, AND 
APPLICATION 249 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012). 
 53 See Sander, supra note 16, at 424. 
 54 Reasons for the lack of translation are provided in Sackett & Ryan, supra note 52, and in-
clude the likelihood that stereotype “triggers” are noisier in real-world settings, and stu-
dents are putting forth more serious and uniform effort on tests that actually affect their 
futures.  
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stigma threat.  Rather, it suggests poor measurement of their creden-
tials.  The studies that have found the strongest evidence of minority 
underperformance, such as William G. Bowen and Derek Bok’s Shape 
of the River, tend to have very weak controls for both the quality of a 
subject’s high school and the difficulty of a student’s curriculum.55  If 
black college freshmen (to take the simplest example) have attended 
substantially weaker high schools and have generally taken less rigor-
ous courses than their white classmates (both of which we know to be 
true), then of course a generic measure of credentials like unadjusted 
high school GPA will tend to overpredict black performance.  When 
we look instead at law students, we find much lower levels of black 
underperformance—so low that the differences with whites are often 
not even statistically significant.56  The explanation?  The black and 
white applicants to law school are coming from a largely overlapping 
set of institutions, and their curricula, though still somewhat diver-
gent, are much more similar across racial lines than is the case for 
high school.  Thus, the significantly better comparability of college 
GPAs across racial groups produces better predictions and thus a 
smaller “underperformance” gap. 
But the clincher in this argument comes with bar exams.  Repeat-
ed studies that control for LSAT scores, first-year law school GPAs, 
and the actual law school that students have attended find no evidence 
of black underperformance.57  Race, so far as psychometricians can 
tell, is completely irrelevant to bar scores once we take into account 
 
 55 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:  LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 72–78 
(1998) (finding strong evidence of minority underperformance, but relying only on very 
broad measures of credentials, such as grouping high school grades into three broad 
categories and ignoring measures such as high school quality).  Both of these factors will 
significantly bias upward predictions, based on credentials, of African-American students’ 
performance. 
 56 A comprehensive analysis by LSAC in 2003 found that black “underperformance” was 
about one-eighth of a standard deviation in first-year grades, or about one-sixteenth of 
the observed gap in black/white performance.  LISA C. ANTHONY & MEI LIU, LAW SCH. 
ADMISSION COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIAL PREDICTION OF LAW SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE BY RACIAL/ETHNIC SUBGROUPS BASED ON THE 1996–1998 ENTERING LAW 
SCHOOL CLASSES, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT 00–02, at 9 
(2003).  In my own subsequent analyses, I found that adding measures of college quality 
and grade inflation eliminated any black/white gap.  See Richard H. Sander, A Reply to 
Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1968 (2005).   
 57 This was the conclusion of the enormous Bar Passage Study undertaken by LSAC in the 
1990s.  See LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAC NATIONAL 
LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 80 (1998).  This has been confirmed by a wide variety 
of independent research.  See, e.g., Stephen P. Klein, Disparities in Bar Exam Passing Rates 
Among Racial/Ethnic Groups:  Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
517, 529 (1991); Sander, supra note 16, at 429. 
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pre-law credentials and law school grades.  Yet bar exams, above near-
ly any other academic setting, should be very ripe for real-world ste-
reotype threats, if they exist:  blacks sitting for the bar know very well 
that black bar passage rates are dramatically below those of whites.58  
Why does race instead have no effect at all upon bar scores?  Because, 
consistent with the college and law school stories told above, the bar 
analyses have the most accurate measures of pre-bar credentials:  re-
sults from standardized LSAT exams, and from essentially identical 
curricula and grading systems at identical law schools.  In other 
words, the better our controls for real academic preparation levels, 
the more race appears to disappear from the performance equation.  
Until convincing reasons can be offered for why these heavily-
documented patterns produce results completely inconsistent with 
the “threat” theories, we should not rely on such theories as central 
guides to our admissions or education policies. 
Finally, it is vital to keep in mind that the policies Hawkins and 
others advocate based on “stereotype” threat and “stigma” threat have 
an immensely counterintuitive problem at their cores.  If these 
threats are real and truly undermine minority performance, the obvi-
ous policy implication is that on college campuses, administrators 
should bend over backwards to avoid using disparate admissions 
standards across racial lines.  For what could more robustly activate 
these threats than using very different admissions standards based on 
race?59  What could more surely produce disparities in performance 
that nourish stereotype threat?60  What could arouse the type of focus 
 
 58 WIGHTMAN, supra note 57, at 80 (presenting the author’s analysis of LSAC data from the 
Bar Passage Study, which found much greater levels of concern about passing the bar 
among black respondents than among whites). 
 59 See JAMES SIDANIUS ET. AL., THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE:  SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS 317 (2008) (finding that in certain circumstances 
students who believed they had been admitted due to racial preferences were at 
significantly higher risk of stigma from their white classmates). 
 60 A key piece of evidence that Hawkins relies on to counter this point instead illustrates the 
shocking shoddiness of much of the research in this area.  Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily 
Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the Egg:  Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 (2008), attempts to demonstrate empirically that minority students 
experience the same type of stigma effects in schools that do not use racial preferences, 
as in schools that do.  But this is “demonstrated” through a sample of seven law schools, 
including three (UC Berkeley, UC Davis, and University of Michigan) operating in states 
where racial preferences were illegal.  Id. at 1305.  At these schools, students were invited 
to take a self-administered web survey, which described itself as a study of stigma 
experienced by minorities.  The response rate at the schools operating in “race-neutral” 
states was only 27% (and dramatically lower than in the “control” states—an intriguing 
finding that the authors ignore) and the number of blacks participating at these schools 
seems to have been a dozen or fewer—all reasons not to take the study seriously.  Its 
greatest problem, however, was that it made no attempt to measure whether the schools 
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on double standards that activates stigma threat?  Yet Hawkins asks us 
to essentially disregard these overwhelmingly common-sense instincts 
and assume that these problems can be dealt with by changing cam-
pus climate and educating racial generalizations out of the majority 
student population. 
IV.  RESPONSIBLE, ACCOUNTABLE SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
A recent series of events at the United States Air Force Academy 
helps to put into strong relief a fundamental difference between Pro-
fessor Hawkins’ approach to these issues and my own. 
Three economists (two of them on the faculty at the Academy) 
undertook a study in the mid-2000s of the effect peers had on cadet 
learning.61  They discovered that, within relatively small groups 
(squadrons of about thirty students), cadets learned more when they 
were in a squadron whose average academic achievement was some-
what higher than their own.  In other words, academic “peer effects” 
were positively related to the academic strength of one’s peers, if the 
peer group was relatively small.  This was an important finding, it 
made intuitive sense, and it complemented nicely many of the ideas 
Professor Hawkins has advanced.  Mismatch effects might be power-
ful in large or anonymous classrooms—where the effect of being aca-
demically weaker meant that one might be left behind in class—but 
they could perhaps be offset in structured, small peer groups, where 
one could benefit from informal study groups or tutoring from aca-
demically stronger students. 
The economists used their peer-group findings to persuade the 
Air Force Academy to undertake a large, randomized experiment 
with incoming cadets—something all too rare in higher education.62  
 
involved actually were race neutral—a rather significant problem, since all the available 
data shows that law schools in states with preference bans, and two of these three law 
schools in particular, continue to use racial preferences.  See, e.g., Danny Yagan, Affirmative 
Action Bans and Black Admissions Outcomes:  Selection-Corrected Estimates from UC Law Schools, 
(Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20361, 
2014) (“[T]he affirmative action ban far from eliminated cross-sectional black admission 
advantages . . . .”).  A significant problem in law school discourse, and one that the 
Hawkins article perhaps inadvertently contributes to, is the tendency of scholars (not 
Hawkins) to produce shoddy empirical research, draw far-reaching conclusions from it, 
publish it in student-edited law reviews (since the research could not withstand serious 
peer-review), have the research widely cited (here Hawkins is at fault), and thus gain 
credibility simply through the frequency with which its findings are uncritically repeated. 
 61 See Scott E. Carrell, Richard L. Fullerton & James E. West, Does Your Cohort Matter?  
Measuring Peer Effects in College Achievement, 27 J. LABOR ECON. 439 (2009). 
 62 See Carrell, Sacerdote & West, supra note 12, at 855 (discussing the parameters of the 
study). 
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The experiment was generously supported by blue-ribbon overseers 
from the National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Ed-
ucation, and the Spencer Foundation.  In the experiment, hundreds 
of cadets were randomly assigned to squadrons, while hundreds of 
others were assigned to squadrons designed to maximize the academ-
ic performance of those students arriving at the Academy with the 
weakest academic preparation.63  These students were assigned to 
squadrons with a mix of high-performing students, thus creating a 
small, squadron-sized environment that matched in many ways the 
large environment at highly-selective universities. 
The results were a surprise.  The low-preparation students as-
signed to the experimental groups had substantially worse academic 
performance than the low-preparation students in the control 
groups.64  In other words, the academic mismatch effects these stu-
dents experienced were aggravated by the experimental squadron 
groups that tried to maximize their small-group interaction with high-
performing students.  The reason?  According to the project design-
ers, the low-performing students “avoided the [students] with whom 
we intended them to interact and instead formed more homogene-
ous subgroups.”65  That is, social mismatch effects aggravated academ-
ic mismatch effects.  The experiment was declared a failure and ter-
minated.  All of those concerned deserve great credit for not 
suppressing results that were, no doubt, embarrassing on all counts.  
Instead, the results were documented in detail and published in 
Econometrica, one of the most prestigious and carefully peer-reviewed 
journals in all social science. 
I give this example not simply to cite another example of well-
documented mismatch (a particularly powerful example both be-
cause of the large-scale, experimental design and because the results 
were neither expected nor favored by the investigators).  My broader 
point is well-captured by the study authors in their conclusion:  “[w]e 
conclude that social processes are so rich and complex that one 
needs a deep understanding of their formation before one can for-
mulate ‘optimal policy.’”66  These are words we should take to heart, 
and which have several clear implications.  We should launch new so-
cial experiments with a sense of humility; they should be set up as 
 
 63 A key motivation for the Academy’s support of the experiment was the desire of “USAFA 
senior leadership [to] reduce the academic probation rate, then at roughly 20 percent.”  
Id. at 856 n.4. 
 64 Carrell, Sacerdote & West, supra note 12.  
 65 Id. at 855. 
 66 Id. at 881. 
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controlled experiments, if at all possible, and in any case should be 
accompanied by maximum transparency, so that we can observe, 
measure, and try to understand their effects. 
The large-scale social experiment known as affirmative action was 
begun, and has since been conducted, in ways almost directly op-
posed to these principles.  Selective colleges and graduate programs 
hastily launched these programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s for 
political reasons, with little or no attempt to experiment with their 
approaches or evaluate the results.  Colleges and universities tended 
to mimic one another’s preference policies, providing little variation 
through which one could compare effectiveness.  And preference 
programs have tended to be shrouded in secrecy, both in terms of the 
size and nature of preferences given, and in terms of the results.  
Steps towards transparency have only just begun, and even now 
transparency is rare. 
Given that so much of this initial transparency has disclosed wide-
spread indications of serious mismatch effects and an almost criminal 
neglect of these effects by higher education administrators, the ap-
propriate response is not to brush these findings aside in the hope 
that more “holistic” admissions and more supportive campuses—
which exist more in the imagination of the proponents than at any 
real-world college—will somehow solve the problems.  Nor should we 
give much credence to researchers who have obvious ideological 
agendas, rely on anecdotes and psychology experiments rather than 
real-world controlled social experiments, and usually fail to publish 
their results in peer-reviewed journals.  We need to insist that our ef-
forts going forward proceed on the basis of valid science, careful ex-
perimentation, and transparency that helps police our efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
